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Abstract
For a more faithful representation of the influence of fiscal policies on the macroeconomic equilibrium, this article aims,
through a variation in modelling the IS/LM component which deals with the goods and services market, to capture the impact 
of the number of taxes on the collection rate. Additionally, these supplies us with the means to grasp the effects of the
specificities of the local bureaucratic system, a system described and condemned, not only politically or informally, but also
through rigorous studies, including those carried out by European institutions. In order to accurately quantify the
above-mentioned relationship, the newly added collection rate function needs to fulfil a series of conditions independently of 
the parameter used to measure the particularities of local systems before a regression is applied, which takes into account fiscal
revenues and the GDP over several years.
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer-review under responsibility of the Emerging
Markets Queries in Finance and Business local organization
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1. Introduction
According to a study published at the beginning of 2012 by the Golden Mind & Spirit consulting company,
in Romania, the state levies more than 300 taxes yearly, of which about 20 are fiscal (general taxes on profits,
wages or other types of income, such as social insurance contributions or VAT), while the rest are parafiscal i.e. 
applied specifically for the authorisation of various entrepreneurial activities Paying 
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2007-2012 (for the previous years) Romania is constantly among the top five places (no. 5, 4, 1, 2, 2 and 2 out 
of the 175, 178, 181, 183, 183 and 183 economies analysed, respectively) by the number of taxes paid by small 
and medium-sized enterprises (89, 96, 113, 113, 113 and 113 respectively). Since joining the European Union, 
it also holds first position within it. The statistics of these reports offer us, however, as consolation the fact that 
our country is not among the first in terms of time spent settling the resulted financial obligations. 
Starting from the standard IS/LM (Investment  Saving / Liquidity preference  Money supply) model, and, 
in it, from the part dealing with the goods and services market, this article proposes a method to assess the 
auspiciousness of introducing a new tax, taking into account not only the autonomous taxation level and the 
taxation rate, but also the number of existing taxes, which are reflected in the collection efficiency. 
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)YtT(rT NN;0NN , where: 
YtT NN;0  refers strictly to the value of fiscal revenues if taxes could be collected in their entirety. 
DY  the disposable income; 
Y  the income (in this case, the GDP); 
Tr  the transfers; 
NT  the taxes collected in case of N taxes; 
Nr  the rate of collection in case of N taxes; 
N;0T  the aggregated autonomous taxation in case of N taxes; 
Nt  the aggregated rate of taxation in case of N taxes. 
 
Suppose the introduction of a new tax is considered: 
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1n,1i0t,T ii0 , where: 
i
0T  the contribution of tax no. i to the aggregated autonomous taxation; 
it  the contribution of tax no. i to the aggregated rate of taxation. 
Consider N
.not
r)N(r  the function representing the relationship between the number of taxes and the collection 
rate, having the following properties: 
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Nr  being a decreasing and convex function, its value dropping with decreasing amounts as the number of taxes 
grows.  
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2. An attempt at modelling 
Relative to the bureaucratic and fiscal mechanisms varying from country to country, ]1;0(N:)N(r *  can 
have, for example, an evolution close to that of the following function: 
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, where: 
]1;0();1[:f  and 
k0.5 is a parameter representing the number of taxes beginning with which the collection rate drops below 50%. 
 
We notice that the function has the following properties: 
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Figure no. 1 presents a few cases belonging to the family of functions defined by )N(f . Different values for 
k0.5 
approximate number of taxes mentioned in the Golden Mind & Spirit study. 
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Fig. 1. 
 
Naturally, the more efficient the administration is in collecting what it sets out to collect, the slower the 
collection rate will drop as the number of taxes increases. Therefore, the more taxes a system can deal with 
before the collection rate reaches 50%, the higher the value of k0.5. Keeping that in mind, the contribution of a 
new tax to fiscal revenues is: 
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For exogenous NN;0 t,T,Y  and 5.0k , starting from 0T , we can deduce the relationship that 
1n
0T  and 
1nt  
(which characterise the considered tax) must have so that the tax is worthwhile at least from a financial point of 
view. 
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3. The regression 
Using the GDP and fiscal revenue data for the years 2006  2010, we can estimate, using regression, the 
values of 0Tr , and tr . The GDPs, the fiscal revenues, the autonomous taxations and the transfers are 
measured in millions of lei (RON). The GDPs are measured in current prices. 
The regression model is: 
YearN;0YearNNYear Y)TYt(rT , where: 
NN tr   
N;0N Tr .  
Table 1. The regression data 
Year YAn TYear 
2006 344,650.6 37,900.2 
2007 416,006.8 44,824.2 
2008 514,700.0 55,133.6 
2009 498,007.5 48,152.9 
2010 522,561.1 56,304.7 
 
YearT  being the dependent variable, we can determine the y-intercept 5,204.4482Tr 300;0300  and the 
slope 0.09421tr 300300 . Ignoring the negligible variations in the number of taxes )300N(  and 
considering the hypothesis that 100k 5.0 , we now calculate the rate of collection 300r : 
44.67%
300log1
1r
100
300   
Using these we can estimate the autonomous taxation 300;0T and taxation rate 300t : 
11,650.47T 300;0  
21.09%t300  
 
The next graph shows the fiscal policy versus its result under the hypothesis that 100k 5.0 . 
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Fig. 2. 
 
As a rule, if the value of Nt  seems unrealistic, it probably means that the value of k0.5 is unrealistic. By making 
sure the value of Nt , resulting from the regression, is inside the interval of the real, common knowledge rate of 
taxation, one can check the hypothesis for k0.5: 
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Therefore we can approximate 5.0k  based on our best approximation of Nt
Nt
~ , by first calculating our best approximation of Nr : 
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Therefore 1Nk
~ 1N
t~
5.0  makes sense only when t
~
N
more money than regulations allow. 
We also notice that: 
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In our particular case 1300k
~ 10.09421N
t~
5.0 . Depending on our evaluation of Nt , 5.0k  will be approximated 
according to the next graph. 0.5
line and axis detail  for 30k
~
5.0   the influence of our beliefs as to the rate of taxation on the value we 
should use as a parameter in our model. 
 
 
Fig. 3. 
If we believe the overall rate of taxation is 40%, taking the data for the 
analysed economy into account, we should use 6 as the number of taxes starting with which the collection rate 
will drop below 50%  
To return to the result of 0T , let us take 4.0r~N , 6k 5.0  and 2010YY . Suppose we have 6 taxes and 
the possibility of a 7th is in sight. The following diagram shows the relationship 70T  and 
7t  must have so that 
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Fig. 4. 
4. Conclusions 
A model like the one we have at our disposal allows us to admit that the tax collecting system, like any man-
made system, is imperfect. Although, philosophically speaking, ignoring such a reality is a good way to 
surmount it, having a decent measurement system that quantifies this reality's influence also works, avoiding 
the previous paradox. In short, we do a regression between the GDP and taxes collected, approximate the tax 
rate, calculate the rate of collection in a particular point and use it and the number of taxes to deduce the 
parameter showing how the analysed collection system works. It can then be determined if a proposed tax is 
viable from a financial point of view. The representation is meant to be seen as a module for the IS-LM model 
which, in spite of its many theoretical strengths, tends to over-simplify the question of taxation. 
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